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(1) Introduction 
 
“The phenomenon of home…used to be an overwhelming and inexchangeable 
something to which we were subordinate and from which our way of life was oriented 
and directed…Home nowadays is a distorted and perverted phenomenon.  It is 
identical to a house; it can be anywhere.  It is subordinate to us, easily measurable in 
numbers of money value.  It can be exchanged like a pair of shoes.” (Vycinas 1961: 
84-85)  
 
In his afterword to the collection „The Home: Words, Interpretations, Meanings, 
Environments‟, David Benjamin considered five aspects of meaning associated with home: 
the word, the descriptive use of the word, the word in psychiatric research, the empirically 
derived cultural phenomenon and the juridical meaning of home.  In relation to the juridical 
meaning of home, Benjamin claimed that: “…the home is still a legally binding definition to 
this day…[and] [m]embers of the elite in Western society take [home] boundaries very 
seriously” (Benjamin 1995: 296).  This article argues that this assertion - that home is 
meaningful in law - must be approached with caution.  While the idea of home has attracted 
considerable critical attention in other disciplines in recent decades, home has continued to be 
represented in law as „identical to a house‟, „easily measurable in numbers of money value‟ 
and „exchang[able] like a pair of shoes‟.  Cross-disciplinary scholarship on the meaning and 
values of home to occupiers - as a social, psychological, cultural and emotional phenomenon 
- has not penetrated the legal domain, where the proposition that home can encapsulate 
meanings beyond the physical structure of the house, or the capital value it represents, 
continues to present conceptual difficulties.   
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At first glance, it does appear as though the significance of home is acknowledged in legal 
discourse.  For example, the obligations imposed on the United Kingdom‟s domestic legal 
institutions by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which gave effect to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, included an obligation to respect private and family life, home 
and correspondence (Article 8(1)).  Consequently, the HRA requires domestic institutions – 
both Parliament and the courts - to ascertain, when article 8 is argued by the home occupier, 
whether legislative measures or judicial decisions involve any prima facie interference with 
the complainant‟s home.  The protection conferred by article 8 is not, however, „absolute‟, 
but „qualified‟.  Where an interference is established, it can be justified under article 8(2), if 
the interference can be shown to be „in accordance with law and…necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others‟.  Thus, the claims of the party seeking to 
„interfere‟ with the occupier‟s home must be balanced against the obligation imposed on 
domestic institutions to respect the applicant‟s home.  
 
However, notwithstanding the apparent recognition of, and regard shown for, home interests 
in article 8, it has recently become apparent that the protection afforded to „home‟ by article 8 
is strictly circumscribed.  Prior to the enactment of the HRA, English courts had appeared 
receptive to the proposition that the right to respect for home in article 8 could be raised as a 
relevant argument against the loss of one‟s home through repossession.1  Nevertheless, post-
incorporation attempts to invoke the provision in this context have been unsuccessful.  In 
Ebert v Venvil, the court acknowledged, in respect of Mrs Ebert‟s appeal against an order for 
the sale of her home in the circumstances of her husband‟s bankruptcy, that: “[i]t is always 
traumatic to be evicted from the family house…and one cannot help but have very great 
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sympathy for her…[But] The European Convention is not a charter which allows bankrupts 
to avoid paying money which the courts have held to be owing to creditors…It is a 
Convention protecting people from encroachment into their basic rights.  It is not a document 
which allows people to avoid paying their debts.” (paras 16-18)  The English courts clearly 
concluded that the occupier‟s right to respect for home was outweighed by the creditor‟s 
claim to recover the capital tied up in the property.  A similar picture has also emerged in the 
context of public sector tenancies, where the House of Lords has unambiguously set out the 
limits of the right to respect for home in article 8. 
 
In the recent decision of London Borough of Harrow v Qazi the House of Lords held that 
article 8 provided no defence to a tenant against the contractual and proprietary rights of a 
landlord or, by analogy, a mortgagee.  The decision in Qazi highlighted the persistent 
difficulties associated with advancing a juridical meaning of home.  In the course of their 
discussion on article 8, the House of Lords stated that „home‟ does not carry any special 
meaning in law.  One consequence of this absence of meaning, it is argued, is that home 
advocates in law are left with little to draw upon when attempting to construct an argument 
for the protection of home-oriented values and interests.  As a result, the absence of a 
coherent legal concept of home has facilitated the subjugation of occupiers‟ interests in their 
homes, particularly when weighed against the objectively measurable claims of creditors and 
landlords (Fox 2002: 586-7).  The decision in Qazi has exacerbated this trend further yet, by 
declaring that where a dispute requires the court to resolve a clash of interests between a 
home interest and a commercial interest within the framework of article 8, it is not even 
necessary to balance the competing claims: rather, the home interest is automatically 
defeated, and „article 8 is simply not applicable‟.   
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The idea of home in law – that is, the development of a coherent and functional legal concept 
of home that recognises a property‟s value other than as a capital asset - is clearly 
problematic, and the neglect of home analysis in law is particularly stark when compared to 
the progress that has been made in other disciplines in relation to the meaning and values of 
home.  This article begins by reviewing the decision in Qazi, before moving on to consider 
the background to the policies that have prevailed in this area of law, and the values that have 
underpinned these policies.  The article considers why, although often (implicitly) 
acknowledging that „home‟ is different from other types of property, English courts have 
been reluctant to attach any significant weight to that distinction.  This is particularly evident 
when the „home‟ dispute is governed by principles of property law.  While analysis in other 
disciplines has taken account of the psychological, social, and emotional aspects of home, 
property law is overwhelmingly oriented towards rationality, and financial interests.  
Consequently, although home theorists have encouraged cross-disciplinary analysis (Altman 
& Werner, 1985, Preface xx) property law has remained broadly unreceptive to home-
oriented arguments, and persisted in identifying the house (home) as a capital asset, easily 
measurable in terms of its money value, and as readily exchangeable as any other item of 
property.             
 
(2) The decision in London Borough of Harrow v Qazi 
 
The decision of the House of Lords in London Borough of Harrow v Qazi clearly illustrates 
the lack of weight attached to the idea of „home‟ in law.  The case was concerned with Mr 
Qazi‟s claim against the housing authority, when his tenancy was terminated and the council 
obtained a possession order of his home.  Mr and Mrs Qazi were joint tenants of a secure 
tenancy under the Housing Act 1980.  Following the breakdown of their relationship, and the 
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departure of Mrs Qazi and their daughter from the property, Mrs Qazi served a notice to quit 
on the housing authority, which was, according to domestic law, effective to terminate their 
joint tenancy.  Mr Qazi, who wished to continue living in the property, applied for a sole 
tenancy, but his application was rejected on the basis that the property provided family sized 
accommodation, and so, in accordance with the authority‟s allocation policy, could not be 
(re-)granted to a single individual.  When Mr Qazi appealed this decision, he revealed that he 
was, by this stage, living in the property with his new wife and her son, and that the second 
Mrs Qazi was pregnant with another child.  The Court of Appeal held that Mr Qazi was 
entitled to remain in the property by virtue of his right to respect for his home under article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, as given effect in domestic UK law under the 
Human Rights Act 1998.  The Council appealed this decision to the House of Lords, who 
reversed the Court of Appeal judgment, and awarded a possession order against Mr Qazi.  In 
the course of the House of Lords decision, the reference to respect for home in article 8 was 
essentially stripped of any effect so far as the defence of possession actions was concerned.   
 
The reasoning of the House of Lords in Qazi is of considerable interest with regard to the 
status of the home in law.  Although there was some difference of approach regarding the 
way in which article 8 should be applied in this context,
2
 all five judges agreed that the 
possession order should be granted in this case.  The first issue the court addressed was 
whether the disputed property could be described as Mr Qazi‟s home for the purposes of 
article 8, and on this question all five judges were satisfied that Mr Qazi qualified.  Lord 
Bingham stated that:   
“On a straightforward reading of the Convention, its use of the expression „home‟ 
appears to invite a down-to-earth and pragmatic consideration whether the place in 
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question is that where a person „lives and to which he returns and which forms the 
centre of his existence‟, since „home‟ is not a legal term of art…” (para 8)     
Lord Bingham explicitly acknowledged the affective significance of „home‟ by commenting 
that: “[n]ot surprisingly, the need for some protection of the home was recognised in the 
Convention, since few things are more central to the enjoyment of human life than having 
somewhere to live…” (para 8)  The definition of „home‟, which Lord Bingham drew from his 
analysis of the UK and Strasbourg case law, was, however, strictly non-technical.  „Home‟ 
was described as an „autonomous concept‟, and Lord Bingham adopted the test set out by the 
European Commission on Human Rights in Buckley v United Kingdom, whereby : “[w]hether 
or not a particular habitation constitutes a „home‟ which attracts the protection of Article 8(1) 
will depend on the factual circumstances, namely, the existence of sufficient and continuous 
links.”; (para 63) that is, an on-going relationship between the occupier and the property.   
 
In one sense, this approach facilitated a broad and flexible interpretation of home: it was not 
necessary for the claimant to fall within a strictly defined legal category of „home‟ in order 
for article 8 to be relevant, and so a claim could be brought even if the relevant domestic 
legislation did not recognise that the property in question constituted the claimant‟s home.  If 
– as discussed below - article 8 conferred a meaningful protection on occupiers in relation to 
the occupation of their homes, then a broadly defined idea of home would enable more 
potential claimants to enjoy that protection.  From another perspective, however, it may be 
regarded as regrettable that, by reducing the idea of home in Article 8 to the property in 
which the claimant lives as a matter of fact, the judgments in Qazi avoided the opportunity of 
engaging with conceptual analyses of the idea of home in law.  The conclusion that: “[home] 
does not…bear a special legal meaning…as does the expression „civil rights‟ for example.  It 
bears its natural and ordinary meaning as popularly understood throughout the contracting 
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states…”; (para 95) ensured that the idea of home in law did not develop beyond to the 
property in which a person lives as a matter of fact: nothing more.   
 
Since the court accepted that the property in question was Mr Qazi‟s „home‟ for the purposes 
of article 8, the next issue to be considered was whether, by taking possession of the property, 
the Council had interfered with Mr Qazi‟s right to respect for home under article 8(1).  
Empirical research has indicated that homes can be meaningful to occupiers in several ways: 
as a physical structure for shelter; as valued territory; to satisfy various social and 
psychological needs; as an area of control; as a place of self-expression; as a secure 
environment; as the territory in which they can achieve privacy; as an aspect of identity; and 
as a socio-cultural unit (Fox 2002).  Nevertheless, the majority of the House of Lords in Qazi 
focused on only one of these aspects of home meanings: the right to privacy within the home.  
Lord Hope reasoned that, since the other limbs of article 8 – the right to respect for private 
and family life and correspondence – were concerned with privacy, the reference to respect 
for home in article 8 was simply another aspect of the more general right to privacy afforded 
by article 8.
3
  Article 8 was delineated as a provision conferring rights with respect to privacy 
in the home, but not with any of the other aspects associated with occupying the property as a 
home.   
 
Having delimited the extent of article 8 in this way, the law lords then divided on the question 
of whether council had interfered with Mr Qazi‟s right to respect for his home.  Lord 
Bingham and Lord Steyn argued that the granting of a possession order against the property 
constituted as prima facie interference with home under article 8(1), but concluded that this 
interference could be justified within the terms of article 8(2).  The majority adopted a more 
restrictive approach, however, by finding that, save in wholly exceptional circumstances, the 
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granting of a possession order in favour of a landlord or a mortgagee, who was entitled to 
possession of the property under domestic law by virtue of their contractual or proprietary 
rights, would not constitute an infringement of article 8(1).  Lord Millett stated that: 
“…once [the court] concluded that the landlord is entitled to an order for possession, 
there is nothing further to investigate.  The order is necessary to protect the rights of 
the landlord; and making or enforcing it does not show a want of appropriate respect 
for the applicant‟s home.” (para 108)      
Although he acknowledged that in many circumstances the court was required to balance the 
interests of the respective claimants, this was not necessary in the present case, since: “…no 
such balancing exercise need be conducted where its outcome is a foregone conclusion.” 
(para 103)  In a concurring judgment, Lord Scott added that it was not necessary to consider 
the effects – social, psychological, emotional - of losing his home on the occupier, since the 
authorities revealed:  
“…no case in which this conclusion [that the landlord‟s rights prevail] has been 
reached by considering the degree of impact on the tenant‟s home life of the eviction.  
There is no case in which a balance has been struck between the tenant‟s interests and 
the landlord‟s rights.  In every case the landlord‟s success has been automatic.  And 
so it must be unless article 8 is to be allowed to diminish or detract from the 
landlord‟s contractual and proprietary rights.  In my opinion, the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence has shown, in effect, that article 8 has no relevance to these 
landlord/tenant possession cases.”  (para 146)     
Lord Scott also extended this reasoning beyond the facts of the instant case, and of landlord 
and tenant disputes, adding that a similar conclusion should be drawn in relation to actions 
for possession by mortgagees (para 137).   
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The interpretation and application of the article 8 reference to home in Qazi was clearly 
influenced by policy factors.  Lord Hope, who expressed concerns about the potential 
consequences of denying the Council of what is currently a convenient procedure by which to 
enforce their right to possession, reasoned that: 
“[t]he point of automatic possession proceedings is generally to provide a quick and 
reliable way of evicting tenants whose leases have by the operation of law been 
terminated.  A procedure which gives a discretion to the court by requiring it to 
consider whether having regard to article 8(2) the making of the order would be 
proportionate is inimical to that purpose…Therein lies the importance in domestic law 
of the issues…in this appeal.” (para 38) 
Since the aim of facilitating landlords in re-taking possession of their properties once a 
tenancy was terminated was unquestionably endorsed, the key consideration was whether the 
court‟s interpretation of article 8 furthered this goal.  The pursuit of this objective was also 
rationalised in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, which included the 
protection of property rights – manifest, in this context, as the landlord‟s (or by analogy, the 
mortgagee‟s) right to possession of the property - within its remit.  It is important to 
emphasise, however, that the major significance of the Qazi decision was the majority 
conclusion that, although both the application of qualified provisions and the resolution of 
disputes involving conflicting convention rights is usually dealt with by conducting a judicial 
balancing exercise between the competing interests, this was unnecessary when the relevant 
interests were the landlord‟s property right and the occupier‟s home right.  In this context, the 
home interest brought no weight to bear against the landlord‟s property right, which 
automatically prevailed.   
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Although the weight attached to the contractual and proprietary claims of the landlord was 
influenced by several factors, including the obligation to protect property rights and the 
housing policy context, the lack of weight conferred on the home interest was also a key 
factor in the outcome of this decision.  While the landlord‟s claim was rooted in the 
conceptually solid terrain of contractual and proprietary rights, the tenant‟s home argument 
appeared insubstantial and incoherent by comparison.  Lord Scott‟s closing comments 
provide a useful summation of the difficulties associated with the idea of home in law.  Since, 
it was argued, Mr Qazi would not have had the opportunity to establish a home in the 
property had it not been for the contractual tenancy granted by the landlord, Lord Scott asked: 
“[h]ow could the termination of that tenancy in a manner consistent with its 
contractual and proprietary incidents be held to constitute a lack of respect for the 
home that had been thus established?  The home was always subject to those 
contractual and proprietary incidents.  The contrary view seems to me to treat a 
„home‟ as something ethereal, floating in the air, unconnected to bricks and mortar 
and land.” (Lord Scott, para 145) 
Once the contractual and proprietary rights associated with Mr Qazi‟s occupation of the 
property were terminated, nothing tangible remained to constitute his „home‟ interest.  In law, 
home is most readily understood as the house, which exists as both a physical structure, and 
as representative of an economic asset; consequently, rights can exist in respect of „bricks and 
mortar and land‟, and interests are recognised in the capital asset represented by the home.  
Lord Scott‟s comments capture the essential sticking point regarding the idea of home in law: 
the idea of home in legal discourse remains some considerable distance from engaging with 
the comprehensive range of meanings that have flowed from home discourse in other 
disciplines.    
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(3) The Idea of Home in Legal Discourse   
  
Despite early indications that suggested some scope for the protection of occupiers in 
possession proceedings through the right to respect for home in article 8, the decision of the 
House of Lords in Qazi negated this possibility by prioritising the proprietary and contractual 
interests of landlords, and, by analogy, mortgagees, rather than the home interests of 
occupiers.  Although the House of Lords emphasised that, so far as the definition of „home‟ 
was concerned, it was “…an autonomous concept which does not depend on classification 
under domestic law…” (para 9), the relevance of existing domestic law so far as the 
substantive complaint was concerned was patent.  When considering whether Mr Qazi had 
suffered an article 8(1) interference with his home, Lord Millett emphasised that the court: 
“…would, of course, have to consider whether the landlord was entitled to possession as a 
matter of ordinary domestic law (ie apart from the Human Rights Act 1998), taking into 
account the various statutory provisions which operate in this field.” (para 108).  Having 
concluded that the Council was, in the circumstances, entitled to exercise its contractual and 
proprietary right to possession, Lord Scott described the failure of the article 8 argument as 
„inevitable‟, since: “…an article 8 defence can never prevail against an owner entitled under 
the ordinary law to possession.” (para 152)  The supremacy of the domestic position was 
emphatically brought home by the statement that: “…once [the court] concludes that the 
landlord is entitled to an order for possession, there is nothing further to investigate.” (para 
108)   
 
The pre-eminence of domestic law in this context is consistent with the approach to article 8 
advocated by the European Court of Human Rights in Hatton v United Kingdom, when the 
court emphasised: “…the fundamentally subsidiary role of the Convention” in assessing 
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whether a particular domestic decision or provision constituted an interference with respect 
for home.  The European Court of Human Rights stated that: 
“…national authorities have direct democratic legitimation and are, as the Court has 
held on many occasions, in principle better placed to evaluate local needs and 
conditions.  In matters of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic 
society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the domestic policy maker should be 
given special weight.” (para 97)   
The approach taken in Qazi - that article 8 did not justify allowing a tenant to „hang on to his 
home‟ when the requirements of domestic law has been complied with4 - was subsequently 
applied in the context of possession actions concerning the owner-occupied family home in 
the context of bankruptcy,
5
 and to priority contest between mortgage lender and home 
occupier.
6
  In National Westminster Bank plc v Malhan, Sir Andrew Morritt V-C followed 
the Qazi approach by rejecting the occupier article 8 argument on the ground that: 
“[i]t would create havoc in the mortgage lending field as well as substantial injustice 
to both borrowers and lenders if priorities clearly settled before the Human Rights Act 
1998 came into force could be altered by its application thereafter.” (para 52)  
The prospect of utilising article 8 to develop an argument in support of home where such a 
claim is not supported in domestic law appears increasingly unlikely.  Rather, it would seem 
that any recognition of the meanings and values of home must emerge from legislative or 
judicial policy decisions at the domestic level.  Evidence to date suggests, however, that 
domestic courts overwhelmingly regard the home in terms of its money value, as the 
exchangeable asset of the house, and thus are inclined towards protecting the capital interests 
of landlords and mortgagees in that asset, rather than the occupier‟s interest in use of the 
property as a home.   
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When faced with the competing claims of an occupier - whose interests are both financial and 
non-financial: for an occupier, the prospect of repossession raises issues ranging from the 
financial and practical value of the property, to social, psychological, and emotional 
attachments to the home – and a secured creditor or mortgagee, whose interests are much 
more readily calculable in financial terms, the English courts have acknowledged that: 
“[t]he two interests are not in any sense commensurable.  On the one hand, one has 
the financial interests of the Crown, some banking institutions and a few traders.  On 
the other, one has the personal and human interests of these two families.  It is very 
hard to see how they can be weighed against each other except in a way which 
involves some value judgment on the part of the tribunal.” (Re Citro, at 150, per 
Nourse LJ) 
However, attempts to argue „home‟ interests in law, particularly against financial interests, 
are beset by difficulties.  Although interdisciplinary research has established the authenticity 
of home meanings, the relationship between an occupier and his or her home, inherently 
intangible and difficult to define, is not readily comprehensible to lawyers.  Legal analysis 
tends to favour the rational, the objective and the tangible (Sugarman 1986) and, as Dovey 
recognised in the context of urban planning: “[r]eason responds to intangibility by reducing 
terms such as home to precise and bounded definitions.  Rationally considered, a home 
becomes reduced to a house; the meaning and experience of home as a relationship becomes 
confused with the object through which it is currently manifest.” (Dovey 1985: 52)  The lack 
of verifiability associated with the idea of home has clearly frustrated efforts to transpose the 
idea of „use value‟ in the home into legal frameworks.  As one commentator who sought to 
define the meaning of home in law concluded: “[i]n the long pursuit of this chimera, the 
hunter always circles back to his starting point and finds no more, yet no less than a dwelling, 
located in space, within and beyond which individual human beings grouped in households 
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engage in a complex set of activities.” (Merritt 1992: 65)  Since legal analysis has not yet 
drawn on cross-disciplinary research into the meanings and values of home, the idea that 
home bears specific and identifiable meanings beyond the physical structure or capital value 
of the house remains, to the legal perspective, an unverifiable and illusive proposition.           
 
It is important to emphasise, however, that the instinct to value „home‟ as a special type of 
property is not totally absent from the legal sphere.  When a creditor seeks to repossess 
property, section 36 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 provides a mechanism for 
delaying the effect of a possession order for a limited period of time where the disputed 
property is a dwelling house, and: “…it appears to the court that in the event of its exercising 
the power the mortgagor is likely to be able within a reasonable time to pay any sums due 
under the mortgage…”  This does provide an example of a legal context where what are in 
substance „home considerations‟ are taken into account, and may enable the occupier to 
obtain interim relief.  However, the conditions for the exercise of the section 36 discretion are 
strict, and wholly focused on the debtor‟s financial ability to make good on arrears within a 
„reasonable time‟ whilst continuing to meet instalments as they fall due:7 the sole criterion for 
obtaining relief is financial.  Similarly, in the context of bankruptcy, sections 336 and 335A
8
 
of the Insolvency Act 1986 directed the court, when exercising its power to capitalise 
property which was occupied as the „family home‟, to have regard to factors such as the 
needs and financial resources of an occupying spouse and any children of the family, as well 
as the interests of secured creditors, yet when balancing the relevant factors the courts have 
typically favoured the financial interests of the creditors, since: “…one must be just before 
one is generous…”9  Furthermore, the court was directed to presume, at the end of a period of 
one year from the vesting of the bankrupt‟s estate in the trustee in bankruptcy, that unless the 
 16 
circumstances of the case are exceptional, the interests of the bankrupt‟s creditors outweigh 
all other considerations (section 336(5)).
10
      
 
This tendency to focus on financial criteria, particularly the financial interests of creditors in 
the capital value of the home rather than the non-financial claims of occupiers to the use of 
the property as a home should not, however, be regarded as evidence of an inherent inability 
in law to recognise the alternative grounds on which home can be regarded as meaningful.  
Rather, this trend clearly emanated from the policy goals that influenced the overhaul of 
English property law in 1925.  One of the central pillars of the 1925 legislation
11
 was that 
land, including a person‟s home, was to be treated in the same way as other forms of 
property.  The reforms sought to make land as easily and securely transferable as possible, by 
treating land as merely another form of capital, as a commercial asset, as readily 
exchangeable as any other asset, and to deny that land had any special meaning just because 
it was occupied as a home.  This goal was achieved, in part, by imposing a statutory „trust for 
sale‟ on all jointly owned property, which presumed that the primary object of any joint 
holding of property – for example between spouses or partners – was investment and sale 
rather than use and occupation.
12
  The Parliamentary debates preceding the Law of Property 
Act (LPA) 1925 attested to the Government‟s policy of assimilating land with other forms of 
property, so that land would carry no special meaning.  This policy met with some opposition 
from members of the legislature, who argued that: “[y]ou cannot compare the transfer of 
stocks and shares with the transfer of property.”;13 and that: “[y]ou may want one special 
piece of land...no one wants one special stock certificate…There is no magic in one stock 
certificate.”14  Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the argument that: “…land is a special 
property.  A man may want one particular piece of land, and it may be that no money can 
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compensate him for the loss of it.”;15 these considerations were outweighed by the 
government‟s desire to facilitate land transactions by designating land as mere capital.   
 
One of the outcomes of this policy was a strong presumption in favour of sale when English 
courts addressed the conflict of interests between the creditor‟s financial claim to property, 
and the occupier‟s interest in retaining the property for use and occupation as a home.  
Although the power to order sale was discretionary,
16
 the legislative policy in support of 
alienability strongly influenced the courts‟ willingness to order sale at the request of 
creditors, and the policy ultimately adopted in the courts was a strong presumption in favour 
of sale – that “…where there are debts outstanding, a sale should be ordered.”;17 that: 
“[b]ankruptcy has, in relation to the matrimonial home, its own claim to protection.”;18 and 
that: “…one must be just before one is generous.”19  The ethos of the 1925 property reforms 
provided the courts with the ideology, the language, the tools and the justification to adopt a 
presumption in favour of sale, to value land as a capital asset only, and to disregard the non-
financial interests of occupiers in their homes, which set the tone for legal analysis 
thenceforth.   
 
The Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 purported to re-introduce the idea 
of use value in the home to the legal framework of property ownership by recognising that 
home owners do not, in reality, regard their property as merely an investment asset.  
Nevertheless, the policy of the earlier legislation had established so clearly the idea that 
property was to be reckoned in terms of its exchange value - that even when dealing with a 
person‟s home, it should be treated as a capital asset - that this perspective was difficult to 
shift.  The objects of the 1996 Act were clear: the idea that land could be assimilated to other 
types of property was criticised, and members recognised that property in the home could 
 18 
hold additional value for its occupiers, by virtue of being: “…the place where the 
beneficiaries live, or want to live in the future.”20  While the 1925 legislation had presumed 
that the purpose of land ownership was: “…as an investment rather than as a home, to be 
bought and sold as market conditions demand, with the beneficiaries being interested in the 
proceeds of sale rather than the property for its own sake.”;21 the 1996 Act purported to 
recognise that: “…most co-ownership of property is for the purpose of providing a home 
rather than an investment.”22  Furthermore, one of the explicit objects of the new regime was 
to recognise that occupiers might suffer a loss from repossession that would go beyond the 
capital value of the property, since their: “…realistic concern is often with the enjoyment of 
the land itself…”23  Consequently, courts considering whether or not to grant an order for the 
sale of the property at the request of a creditor were directed to take into consideration a 
number of factors, including the intention behind the purchase, the interests of any 
beneficiaries in occupation, and the interests of any minor occupiers, as well as the interests 
of any secured creditors.
24
  Yet, with the exception of one recent case,
25
 the courts have 
remained largely faithful to the ethos of the 1925 legislation, and continued to favour sale 
over retention of property when balancing commercial claims with home interests.
26
  
 
It is interesting to consider the policy justification advanced in support of this pro-sale 
tendency, even in the face of the apparent recognition of home meanings in the 1996 Act.  
One of the arguments most frequently advanced as justification for prioritising sale over 
„home-oriented‟ interests is the need to protect the financial interests of creditors and 
landlords, since they control the capital on which the housing system relies so heavily.  
Otherwise, it is reasoned, capital holders will be unwilling to invest in the housing system, or 
will offer less attractive terms, so that ultimately the housing consumer will pay (see Fox 
2002: 585-587).  There has been a significant lack of interest in pursuing alternative avenues, 
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which while not inherently alien to legalistic analysis might allow more scope for 
consideration of home interests.  For example, an alternative economic analysis could move 
beyond the immediate financial interests of landlords and creditors, and take account of the 
broader costs of repossession, not only to home occupiers, but to the economy as a whole, by 
factoring in the costs – both direct, in terms of the burden imposed on the state by emergency 
housing costs, and indirect, in relation to the wider economic burden imposed on society – 
associated with loss of home.   
 
Ford et al (2001) identified several socio-economic consequences flowing from mortgage 
arrears and repossessions, including financial costs, which range from outright losses to costs 
resulting from the physical deterioration of property, and the social and psychological costs 
associated with housing debt, restricted residential mobility, relationship difficulties, health 
related costs, and administrative costs.  These costs, it was argued, may be experienced by a 
range of actors: borrowers, lenders, insurers, central government, local government, housing 
market institutions, labour market institutions, and health services (Ford et al 2001: 108).  
These findings challenge the presumption that appears to have taken hold in the legal domain, 
that an economic analysis of home possessions can be reduced to a policy of facilitating the 
protection of commercial interests to ensure the flow of capital into housing.  While this 
solution may satisfy the interests of individual creditors or landlords, in the long term the 
ultimate question of „who pays‟ is much more complex.  If economic analysis is the 
justification for allowing commercial interests to routinely outweigh home interests, then 
there is currently no indication that all costs - financial and non-financial - have been taken 
into account.   
 
(4) Land law, logic and legal reasoning 
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Interdisciplinary research has greatly enhanced our understanding of the values which home 
represents to its occupiers (see for example, Despres 1991; Smith 1994); the nature of the 
relationship between the occupier and the home (Altman & Werner 1985; Benjamin 1995) 
and the effect of involuntary loss of home on the well-being of occupiers (Fried 1963; 
Porteous 1995).  Although the idea of attachment to home remains essentially subjective and 
intangible: “…home is not an empirical variable whose meaning we might define in advance 
of careful measurement and explanation.  As a consequence, understanding in this area is 
plagued by a lack of verifiability that many will find frustrating.” (Dovey 1985: 34); 
scholarship in other disciplines has endeavoured to unpack the complex issues wrapped up 
with human responses to home, and significant progress has been made in this area.  Law, 
however, has appeared generally resistant to the influence of this developing body of 
scholarship, as recently illustrated in Qazi, when the House of Lords dismissed the idea that 
home could be distinguished from the house as suggesting the existence of: “…something 
ethereal, floating in the air, unconnected to bricks and mortar and land.” (para 145)  The 
proposition that home could be valued in law, other than as a physical structure or a capital 
asset, was dismissed with language evoking images of a vaporous, insubstantial (non-)entity. 
 
The tendency of the English courts to favour the capital claims of creditors and landlords 
over the home interests of occupiers is explicable, in part, by the apparent incongruities 
between home analysis, on the one hand, and legal discourse – particularly „property-speak‟ – 
on the other.  In the first place, the introduction of „home‟ analysis - particularly with regard 
to emotional, psychological, social and other attachments - into the legal domain appears to 
run counter to the presumed rationality of the legal system: procedurally fair, treating like 
cases alike, and thus disinclined to attach weight to subjective or emotional factors.
27
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Consequently, the idea of home in law has not carried much weight, particularly when 
balanced against easily measurable, legally definable, proprietary and contractual interests in 
the property.  This was illustrated in Le Foe v Le Foe, when a qualitative distinction was 
drawn between the creditor‟s financial claim against the property and Mrs Le Foe‟s 
emotional claim to her home.  While Ward LJ acknowledged that the disputed property: 
“…has been her home and her mother‟s home.  There is a huge emotional investment in it” 
(para 10) the court concluded that Mrs Le Foe‟s emotional attachment to her home was: 
“…an interest I cannot protect.” (para 13)  Furthermore, land law is often regarded as the sine 
qua non of this legal model of rationality, with leading commentators characterising it as a 
„rational science‟ in which: “…the perfection of pure reason appears most nearly attainable.  
English land law – more obviously than any other area of the law…displays many of the 
features of a closed system of logic…” (Gray & Gray 2003: 204-5)  The idea of home - as an 
experiential, intangible, if nonetheless real phenomenon – does not sit easily within this 
framework of objectively measurable, clearly definable interests.   
 
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that, although law is often regarded as 
predominately rational, it is ultimately a system though which human actors seek to regulate 
human behaviour, and thus can never be an „exact science‟.  One commentator has argued, 
however, that where „human nature‟ has influenced law it is: “…commitments to ownership 
and exchange [that have been regarded as] the activities it takes to be distinctly human and 
centrally important to human welfare.” (Feldman, 2000: 1425)  This impression has also 
filtered through to the context of land law, where it has been suggested that on the occasions 
when strict rationality gives way to factors that are „unquestionably fuzzy‟, the extrinsic 
values that have been brought to bear against the strict logic of the system have, increasingly 
in recent decades, tended towards commercial interests rather than „home-type‟ interests.  In 
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relation to dealings between creditors and occupiers, or landlords and tenants: 
“…relationships are strictly commercial, bargaining is hard-nosed, social bondings are 
minimal and the value attached to land is primarily, perhaps even exclusively, an „exchange 
value‟.  Altruism is in very short support; we are talking money.” (Gray & Gray 2003: 241)  
Not only does the central core of strict logic and rationality in (property) law tend to favour 
the objectively measurable (in money terms) interests of creditors, over and above the 
subjective, intangible, non-financial „home‟ interests of occupiers, but the values by which 
this rationality is tempered also tend towards the financial interests of commercial parties 
rather than the non-financial, social, psychological or emotional „home‟ claims of occupiers.  
Consequently, when located within the framework of current land law logic, and in the 
absence of cross-disciplinary analysis, the idea of home can be dismissed as a mere chimera – 
an intangible, irrational and indefinable relationship with property, of little relevance to the 
„hard-nosed‟ business of legal decision making.     
 
(5) An Idea of Home in Law?  
 
“…land is not just piles of coins, walls of exclusion, but also a different ownership, 
unrecognised in the old books, a having by using, a possessing by sharing…” (Green 
1995: 156-7)  
 
What prospect, then, for the idea of home in law?  Should home-advocates admit defeat and 
resign themselves to the prospect that, notwithstanding the authenticity of home meanings, 
they are either unrecognisable, or unimportant, to lawyers?  Although recent case law on the 
application of the right to respect for home in article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights has established the limited scope of that line of analysis, it is important to bear 
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in mind that there is nothing inherently unworkable about the idea of home in law.  In fact, 
although the idea of home has not prevailed in possession contexts, the idea that a person‟s 
home amounts to a special type of property has not been wholly absent from legal discourse.  
The idea that a home should be treated differently from other types of property is evident in 
tax law, where the financial benefits which flow from ownership of one‟s home are exempt 
from capital gains tax and from income tax, and in the law governing compulsory purchase of 
property, whereby the payment a property owner receives includes additional compensation 
where the compulsorily purchased property is occupied as a home: “…to make some 
compensation to a man for the loss of his home…” (R v Corby District Council, ex p 
McLean).  From the turn of the twentieth century until the 1980s the Rent Acts, which 
conferred security of tenure on the basis of residential occupation, were premised on the 
law‟s recognition of the special values represented by property occupied as a home.  More 
recently, the Enterprise Act 2002 has introduced measures to provide some degree of 
protection for some homes in the event of bankruptcy by exempting „low value homes‟28 
from applications for sale or possession, and by providing that the home of a bankrupt or a 
bankrupt‟s spouse or former spouse should cease to form part of the bankrupt‟s estate if, after 
a period of three years from the instigation of bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee in 
bankruptcy has not taken steps to possess or sell the property.
29
  Although they cannot be 
regarded as amounting to a legal concept of home, these ad hoc examples provide evidence 
of the law‟s capacity to recognise ideas related to home in order to further particular policy 
aims, so long as this does not run counter to the overarching goals of the system.
30
   
 
Yet, it remains evident that legal discourse has not developed a coherent concept of home 
which is capable of carrying weight against competing claims, such as the protection of 
commercial interests.  When posited against such claims, home interests seem to evaporate 
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into the ether.  In comparison with the tangible, measurable, objective claims on capital, the 
idea of a subjective attachment to home can readily be dismissed as insubstantial, not 
provable, and therefore irrelevant to legal decision making.  The idea of home in law could 
acquire substance by drawing on theoretical developments and empirical evidence from other 
disciplines, yet, to date, lawyers, particularly property lawyers, have not engaged with home 
discourses.  Nevertheless, advocates seeking to establish cross-disciplinary contact with a 
view to placing home-oriented analysis on the legal landscape should bear in mind that, 
although the protection of commercial interests appears firmly established within the current 
legal framework, law – even land law - is not immutable.  Only a few decades ago, leading 
land law commentators suggested a shift towards: “…the idea that the possession of the 
actual occupier of land must be protected.” (Gray & Symes 1981: iv); based on law‟s 
recognition that: “[t]he things which are today of real value to the man on the street are assets 
like his job, his pension, and the right to undisturbed possession of his home.” (Gray & 
Symes 1981: 11)  Greater recognition of the value of home in possession contexts was 
predicted, although this did not come to fruition as housing laws and policies since the 1980s, 
in relation to both owner occupation and rented property, have prioritised the protection of 
capital interests to encourage lending to home owners and investment in the private rental 
sector.  Nevertheless, a number of arguments could yet be advanced in support of developing 
the idea of home in law in the context of possession actions.   
 
Firstly, there is support within property theory for the recognition of home in law, above and 
beyond the capital asset of the house.  Radin has argued in favour of a „personhood 
perspective‟ in property law: that is, recognition of the possibility that an individual‟s 
attachment to particular property, for example their home, may be so strong that the property 
becomes constitutive of their personhood.  Since: “…some property is worthier of protection 
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than other property.” (1993: 48) Radin proposed that “…the personhood 
perspective…[could] serve as an explicit source of values for making moral distinctions in 
property disputes…” (Radin 1993: 35)  The home is presented as a quintessential example of 
„worthy‟ property on the ground that: “…in our social context a house that is owned by 
someone who resides there is generally understood to be towards the personal end of the 
continuum.  There is both a positive sense that people are bound up with their homes and a 
normative sense that this is not [an undesirable response].” (Radin 1993: 54)  Radin argued 
that the law of the United States had implicitly recognised the: “…traditional connection 
between one‟s home and one‟s sense of autonomy and personhood.” (Radin, 1993: 57)  The 
application of a personhood perspective to home in contemporary property law could be 
bolstered by advances in other disciplines with regard to delineating the meanings and values 
of home, and research on the consequences of loss of home through repossession.  
Furthermore, it is arguable that, bearing in mind the recent suggestion that law is 
experiencing a process of „re-emotionalization‟ (Laster & O‟Malley, 1996; Karstedt, 2002), 
which, it has been suggested is linked to broader patterns of emotional culture in late modern 
societies (Karstedt, 2002; Wouters, 1986; Barbalet, 1998; Williams, 2001), it could now be 
apposite to argue for greater recognition of home attachments, hitherto dismissed in law as 
„mere emotion‟.   
 
Another possibility would be to advance home analysis in the legal domain by highlighting 
particular aspects of home meanings and attachments.  The idea of „family home‟ carries 
significant policy kudos, and as a result the law has traditionally tended to favour arguments 
involving „family home‟ rather than merely home per se.31  Nevertheless, even the „family 
home‟ argument has not been sufficiently persuasive to outweigh commercial interests, as the 
court has concluded that: 
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“…it is not uncommon for a wife with young children to be faced with 
eviction…Such circumstances, while engendering a natural sympathy in all who hear 
of them, cannot be described as exceptional.  They are the melancholy consequences 
of debt and improvidence with which every civilised society has been familiar.” (Re 
Citro at 157, per Nourse LJ)  
The recent High Court decision in Edwards v Lloyd’s TSB Bank has suggested, however, that 
there may yet be some scope for the development of a defence that focuses more specifically 
on the presence of children in the home.  In Edwards, the court refused an application for sale 
by the bank in the interests of the welfare of the children who occupied the property as their 
home.  The decision in Edwards is significant as (somewhat surprisingly) the first reported 
decision in which the court explicitly balanced the interests of creditors to capitalise the 
property against the interests of child occupiers in the use and occupation of the property as 
their home.
32
  A number of factors persuaded the court to postpone the sale of the property 
for a period of at least five years.  Bearing in mind the difficulty that Mrs Edwards was likely 
to encounter in finding another, smaller house, if the order for sale were to be granted, and 
the fact that the bank‟s security was not in jeopardy,33 Park J held that: “[i]n the 
circumstances I do not want to order an immediate sale, because I believe that that would be 
unacceptably severe in its consequences upon Mrs Edwards and her children.” (para 33)  
Since the court remained of the view that the bank would eventually, albeit later rather than 
sooner, be able to recover the debt, with interest, the order for sale was postponed for a period 
of five years, until the younger child would have reached the age of eighteen.  By this time, 
the court reasoned: “…it seems possible that…it will no longer be in practice incumbent on 
Mrs Edwards to provide a home at her expense for her son and daughter.” (para 33(iii))  Park 
J even went so far as to suggest that sale might be postponed even further, if, for example, 
either or both of the children were still in full time education at the end of five years, and 
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therefore still: “…in practice dependent on their mother for the provision of a home.” (para 
33(iv))   
 
The association between children and home is potentially fruitful for a number of reasons.  
One the one hand, legal discourse is accustomed to not only taking account of, but 
prioritising the interests of children, and it is suggested that in constructing a „family-
oriented‟ home argument, the functional relationship between parent(s), child(ren) and home 
would be a more appropriate starting point than the „spouse-centred‟ approach that typified 
„family home‟ arguments in the past.34  In addition, there is interdisciplinary support for 
focusing on children within the home: empirical research has established that the value of 
home as a place of security and protection is heightened when children are present (Fitchen 
1989), and that it is the presence of children that makes a house into a home (Rakoff 1977).  
For the child, the significance of the home environment has been clearly established (Parke 
1978), while the loss of a child‟s home has been described as: “…nothing less than an 
invitation to chronic illness.” (Smizik & Stone 1988)  The concept of the child‟s home is one 
angle which is worthy of further analysis within the legal domain.  
 
(6) Conclusion 
 
The decision in London Borough of Harrow v Qazi emphasised the difficulties currently 
faced by home advocates in English courts.  Not only do the commercial interests of landlord 
and creditors outweigh the home interests of occupiers, but the House of Lords has stated that 
it is not even necessary to weigh „home‟ interests in the balance when applying article 8 to 
possession proceedings.  It therefore falls to domestic provisions to determine whether home 
interests are protected in this context.  At present, the courts are overwhelming inclined to 
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protect the non-occupier‟s interests in the property as a capital asset over the occupier‟s 
interest in the home.  Although law is not inherently unable to accommodate a coherent 
concept of home, developments in other disciplines have yet to make any significant impact 
on legal reasoning and, if anything, the historical shift has been away from home-oriented 
thinking in law.  It is, of course, important to bear in mind the commercial and practical 
constraints within which the law regulates possession proceedings between home interests 
and commercial actors.  Nevertheless, and although the weight attached to home in law has 
declined, the tools exist in law for the re-emergence of home-oriented arguments.  Advocates 
of such an approach could usefully draw upon the development of the concept of home in 
other disciplines when arguing that, notwithstanding legal statements to the contrary, home is 
meaningful beyond its capital value.    
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1
 In Albany Home Loans Ltd v Massey, which concerned repossession of the defendant‟s home following default 
on the mortgage by her husband, Schiemann J suggested that Article 8: “…provides a clue to the solution to the 
problems posed by this case…” (at 612).   
2
 The House of Lords fell broadly into two camps, with Lord Bingham and Lord Steyn in the minority and Lord 
Hope, Lord Millett and Lord Scott in the majority. 
3
 “[t]he emphasis is on a person‟s home as a place where he is entitled to be free from arbitrary interference by 
the public authorities.  Article 8(1) does not concern itself with the person‟s right to peaceful enjoyment of his 
home as a possession or as a property right.” (para 50) 
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4
  The decision of the House of Lords in Qazi has subsequently been applied in several Court of Appeal 
decisions: see Newham London Borough Council v Kibata [2003]EWCA Civ 1785; Birmingham City Council v 
Bradney; Birmingham City Council v McCann [2003]EWCA Civ 1783; Lough and others v First Secretary of 
State [2004]EWCA Civ 905; furthermore, as Auld LJ noted in Lambeth Borough Council v Kay [2004]EWCA 
Civ 926, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that Mr Qazi‟s application to it did not disclose any 
appearance of a violation of the Convention or its protocols and declared it inadmissible (11 March 2004). 
5
 Hosking v Michaelides [2004]All ER (D) 147.  
6
 National Westminster Bank plc v Malhan [2004]EWHC 847 (CH). 
7
 See, for example, Cheltenham & Gloucester Building Society v Norgan [1996]1 WLR 343. 
8
 As amended by the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996.  
9
 Re Bailey [1977]1 WLR 278 at 284, per Walton J.  This philosophy was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in 
Re Citro [1991]Ch 142. 
10
 The effects of the Qazi decision reverberated in this context in Hosking v Michaelides, when Paul Morgan 
QC, sitting in the High Court, stated that he: “…would not have been prepared to hold that section 336 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, construed in accordance with the approach in Re Citro [see note 6 and associated text] was 
incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights having regard to the way in which Article 8 
was construed by the majority of the House of Lords in Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi…” (para 70). 
11
 „The 1925 legislation‟ is an expression to refer collectively to the major overhaul of the property system 
effected by the Law of Property Act 1925, the Land Registration Act 1925, the Settled Land Act 1925 and the 
Trustee Act 1925, the Land Charges Act 1925 and the Administration of Estates Act 1925.   
12
 As the Law Commission for England and Wales would later observe: “The defining feature of the trust for 
sale…is that the trustees are under a duty to sell the trust land.  Implicit in this is the notion that this land should 
be held primarily as an investment asset rather than as a „use‟ asset.”; Law Com No 181, Transfer of Land: 
Trusts of Land (1989), para 3.1. 
13
 154 HC Deb (5
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 Series) col 145 (15 May 1922). 
14
 154 HC Deb (5
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 Series) col 124 (15 May 1922). 
15
 154 HC Deb (5
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 Series) col 124 (15 May 1922). 
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 LPA 1925, section 30. 
17
 Re Lowrie [1981]3 All ER 353 at 355-6, per Walton LJ. 
18
 Re Bailey [1977]1 WLR 278 at 279, per Megarry VC. 
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 Law Com No 181, para 3.10. 
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 569 HL Deb (5
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 Series) col 1718 (1 March 1996).  
22
 Ibid.  Interestingly, in the course of these debates, Lord Browne-Wilkinson described this shift from „home as 
capital‟ and exchange value towards recognition of the use value of the home for its occupiers as being: “…at 
last…a little bit of common sense…” (569 HL Deb (5th Series) col 1725 (1 March 1996). 
23
 Law Com WP No 106, para 3.1. 
24
 Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, section 15.  
25
 In the decision in Edwards v Lloyd’s TSB Bank [2004]EWHC 1745 (CH), the court adopted a much more 
„home-oriented approach‟ to the issue of sale where the welfare of minor occupiers was in issue; see further, 
section 5, below.  
26
 See for example, TSB Bank plc v Marshall [1998]39 EG 308; Bank of Ireland Home Mortgages Ltd v Bell 
[2001]2 FLR 809; First National Bank plc v Achampong [2003]EWCA Civ 487).  In Bank of Ireland Home 
Mortgages Ltd v Bell, endorsed by the Court of Apeal in First National Bank plc v Achampong, Gibson LJ 
stated the policy of the courts under sections 14 and 15 of the TLA: “Prior to the 1996 Act the courts under s30 
of the Law of Property Act 1925 would order the sale of a matrimonial home at the request of the trustee in 
bankruptcy of a spouse or at the request of a creditor chargee of a spouse, considering that the creditors‟ interest 
should prevail over that of the other spouse and the spouse‟s family save in exceptional circumstances.”  
Although Gibson LJ suggested that: “[t]he 1996 Act, by requiring the court to have regard to the particular 
matters specified in s15, appears to me to have given scope to some change in the court‟s practice.”, he 
concluded that: “[n]evertheless, a powerful consideration is and ought to be whether the creditor is receiving 
proper recompense for being kept out of his money, repayment of which is overdue (see Mortgage Corporation 
Ltd v Lewis Silkin (25 February 2000, unreported)).  In the present case it is plain that by refusing sale the judge 
has condemned the bank to go on waiting for its money with no prospect of recovery from Mr and Mrs Bell and 
with the debt increasing all the time, that debt already exceeding what could be realised on a sale.  That seems to 
me to be very unfair on the bank.” [2001]2 All ER (Comm) 920, para 31. 
27
 Laster & O‟Malley argued that “Enlightenment assumptions about rationality, objective truth and formal legal 
equality obviously have shaped modern law.  Since the eighteenth century, the processes of law have been used 
to…remove emotions and the non-rational from legal considerations and the administration of justice.  Emotions 
can be seen as antithetical to order, justice and coherence: the object of law was to define and refine the 
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measures which would provide an objective basis of assessing causation, the nature of wrongdoing and the 
method of assessment of harm.  In both civil and criminal law, the focus increasingly came to be on 
(measureable or calculable) physical harm and pecuniary loss.” (Laster & O‟Malley, 1996: 24) 
28
 Enterprise Act 2002, s313A.  A „low value home‟ is defined in the Insolvency Proceedings (Monetary Limits) 
(Amendment) Order 2004 as a property with equity worth less than £1,000 after deductions for mortgages or 
other charges, third party interests and the reasonable costs of sale.  
29
 Enterprise Act 2002, section 283(A). 
30
 The objects of the Enterprise Act 2002 included the promotion of enterprise by minimising the effects of 
failure, relaxing the effects of bankruptcy and reducing the sense of stigma associated with it; see Levy & 
French, 2003.  
31
 See for example, Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 and 1983, Family Law Act 1996, and sections 336 and 335A 
of the Insolvency Act 1986.  
32
 Section 15(1)(c) sets out the welfare of any minor who occupies the property as his home as a factor to be 
taken into consideration in the exercise of the court‟s discretion, while section 15(d) of the Trusts of Land and 
Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 requires the court to have regard for the interests of any secured creditor of 
any beneficiary.  
33
 The debt owed to the bank did not exceed the value of the interest in the property (50%) over which the bank 
had an equitable charge. 
34
 The shift in focus to provision for children rather than between conjugal partners, to a definition of family that 
revolves around the caregiving relationship between a dependent child (or other dependent person) and his or 
her principal nurturer - most often the mother - and the shift towards considerations of children‟s welfare is also 
in line with developments in family law; see for example, Fineman, 1995; Woodhouse 2000.  
